An interesting article:

On Christmas Day 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The socialist state eventually deployed more than one hundred thousand troops to the region and placed its armed forces within striking distance of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a great portion of the world’s oil supply transited. President Carter addressed Congress three weeks later and detailed the dangers he believed the USSR posed. The Soviet troops, he said, were seeking to dominate a region that contained two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil and posed “a grave threat” to the free movement of Middle East oil.

“This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come,” he said during the 1980 State of the Union Address. He later added: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”…

…In 1980, a hostile superpower was within striking distance of choking off a significant percentage of the oil necessary to power the United States. Not only is that no longer the case, but other nations are now more reliant on Persian Gulf oil than the United States. When the Carter Doctrine was first put into action, the Chinese were an oil exporter. They did not import any oil from the Middle East, but owing to a rapidly growing economy, they became a net oil importer in 1993.

China’s thirst for oil continues to rapidly grow. The country currently imports seven mbd of the twelve mbd it consumes—the vast majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf. Glaser and Kelanic explain that despite slowing economic growth, Beijing’s imports from the Gulf are expected to quintuple by 2030. Should the United States, then, continue to expend a great portion of its national-security budget to keep the Persian Gulf oil flowing for the benefit of China?

Clearly, a reexamination of U.S. strategy vis-à-vis the Middle East is in order. Even with the continued development of domestic oil and gas fields, along with the rise of alternative forms of energy, the United States is going to require some amount of oil from Saudi Arabia. But is that continued interest commensurate with the perpetuation, unaltered, of the Carter Doctrine? The answer is no.

There is presently no major power poised to strike oil facilities in the region. The United States gets no oil from Iran, so even if its exports are blocked in the future (owing to sanctions, for example), that block would have little impact on U.S. imports. The exporting countries themselves have an existential need to export large quantities of oil. For example, regimes in nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar are economically dependent on oil revenue to maintain internal stability. It can be argued, therefore, that while Middle Eastern oil remains a U.S. interest, it is no longer a vital national interest. Our security posture and strategy should therefore be updated to reflect current realities and priorities.

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