If you have a duty to support and defend the Constitution, against all enemies, foreign and domestic, then you have a duty to know what an enemy of the Constitution would look like.  For foreign enemies, this is pretty well covered, or so far beyond reach that it’s not worth worrying about on an individual basis.  A foreign enemy of the Constitution who is not an imminent military threat will require domestic aid and comfort in order to do any harm, so the focus here should be on domestic enemies.

I propose a series of tests (in the judicial sense of the term) by which we may know a domestic enemy.

An enemy of the Constitution is probably a lifelong enemy.  Defense means different things, based on the threat.  An enemy at rest, at a distance, is defended against in a deterrent, general fashion, whereas an up-close attacking enemy is defended against in a specific, kinetic fashion.  Because our goal in identifying such enemies is to determine what should be done, we will work backwards from the distinction between two types.  Those enemies against which immediate action (which can begin with conversations, letters, phone calls, civil disobedience, lawsuits and so forth) is a requirement, duty, and those against whom action may be necessary but perhaps not immediately.  And I’ll point out here that the goal is to defeat enemies of the constitution without violence, which is why we are talking about this now; before violence is necessary.

So let there be two tiers of “domestic enemies of the Constitution”; those who pose a clear and present danger, and who therefore require immediate counteraction, and those who do not.  The first type would be those of credible means who pursue a purposeful and unambiguous course of action which directly threatens a specific, identifiable pillar of our system of government as set out in the Constitution as amended.

Breaking that down, a candidate for immediate action under the oath (see Part 1) must satisfy the following conditions:

• Is domestic
  • is not a foreign government or entity, or formally an agent of a foreign government or entity
  • Is a US citizen or is being treated as a US citizen through benefits or legal protection in equivalence to US citizens
• Poses a threat to a specific, identifiable, essential component of the Constitutional process  (this will be covered in a separate section)
  • The component must be a thing which if corroded or corrupted breaks other functions of the Constitution
  • An example is the Electoral College, which is threatened by various “popular vote” proposals, without which, Federalism can not function.
• Pursues a purposeful and unambiguous course of action to implement the threat
• Possess credible means to carry out the threat
  • Even without first amendment protections, a citizen would not meet this test without a more powerful position than “voter” or “activist”

Those who do not would be those who espouse or promote systems or features of government for the United States which are not Constitutional and who are not committed to accomplishing those ends in a Constitutional manner.

Actions

Many people are trapped in a false choice between exposure to accusations of treason (or at least sedition) on the one hand, and the forfeiture of rights (or dereliction of duties) on the other, when the conversation develops into justifying armed action against “the government”.  As if you could shoot at a government.  For me, the short version of the solution to this false dilemma is to refuse to address it at all. There’s a long version as well, but it will have to wait, and hopefully, it won’t need much discussion anyway.

Focus instead on what can be done without force of arms. After all, force of arms is designed not to wound people, but to accomplish some goal typically involving words on paper. So focus on the words and the paper. Meanwhile, keep your powder dry, and work in good faith to ensure that it never needs to be used.

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UNINCORPORATED NOTES:

Purpose:

to set out discriminants by which we may know a domestic enemy, triggers for actions, appropriate actions, and goals of action; that is, endpoints to trigger de-escalation.  Obviously, what is merely political is out of bounds, and what is clearly criminal is already (purportedly) dealt with through other means.  Fences must be erected to channelize suspect domestic enemies through the decision making process for weighing in the balance.

Law:

The definition of a domestic enemy should be maintained by the citizenry, and by those citizenry who are on the side of the Constitution.  The COnstitution is not neutral in matters of Liberty, and is not represented by those who would curtai liberty for ease of government or reduction of politicl doscourse.  While the input of citizens knowledgeable in the law will be indispensable, this is not and will never be a legal document.  The document from which I draw my authority is the Constitution itself, and I am jealously guarding that relationship by carefully constraining both the definition and acceptabel courses of action.

None of this is necessary if the political and governmental process still supports the COnstitution, so I will not rely upon politics or government (which intersect in laws) to arrive at a definition.

Concentric zones:

DE1:

DEs which require action (more than monitoring)

• Government officials, elected, appointed, or career
• Those engaging in terrorist threats or acts with the purpose of corrupting constitutional processes

DE2:

DEs which do not require action (require specific monitoring or less)

• Journalists and editors / publishers engaged in blatant or admitted quid pro quo propaganda
• Same, but who claim to be “forced”.  Sorry, special power requires special strength.
• Monitor in particular.  Attempt to build “case” to prove DE1; if not “proven” then fine, keep monitoring

[Non-DE]:

Enablers who are not DEs (merely unpleasant rabble enjoying first amendment rights)

• Journos &c gleefully promoting fascism — they have the right
• Monitored in general by simple diligence