This is a paper I wrote many years ago, it covers the movement of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Have a cup of coffee (Tanzanian Teaberry would be nice for this), and enjoy the read.  Please be advised. THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BEFORE MUGABI DESTROYED ZIMBABWE AND HAS NOT BEEN EDITED IN ANY WAY. So please, bear that in mind:

This paper will examine the various cleavages in the main parties involved in the revolutionary struggle in what was then Rhodesia. I will refer to Zimbabwe as Rhodesia until this paper reaches the post-election phase. The cleavages are not only between black and white, they are also between black and black. International involvement will be discussed as well.

Background

Common Borders: Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, South Africa, and Mozambique. Mozambique and Zambia at the time frame for this paper were militant African Marxist. Zimbabwe is 390,580 sq km, roughly the same size as California, has a population of 9.7 million, 77% Shona, 18% Ndebele and 5% listed as others, the Population is 60% Traditional Animist and 40% Christian. Her principle exports are tobacco, cotton, sugar, meat, gold, nickel, asbestos, ferro-alloys, textiles, and clothing. Her main trade partners are UK, South Africa, Germany and the United States.

Colonialism

To understand the problems in Rhodesia, one must first understand the causes of the problems in Africa as a result of European Colonialism. Before the Europeans arrived in the continent, African culture already had many tribal and ethnic divisions. When the Europeans arrived, they did not see the differences in the Africans. What they saw was an homogeneous group of primitives residing in a continent that was, as they saw it, in need of civilization and development. Because the Europeans arrived with a tremendous technical advantage and abused the trusting nature of the Africans, they quickly colonized a majority of usable land on the continent. This does no mean that in pre-Colonized Africa all tribes were at peace and did not wage war on each other. That assumption flies in the face of human nature. By believing that the Europeans were bringing culture into what they saw as a primitive continent, and bringing Christianity to the pagans, they believed that they were doing the right thing by their mores. However, the results and methods were not right, and often morally reprehensible.

As Palmer relates, “In 1890 Mashonaland was invaded and occupied by the British South Africa Company (founded by Cecil Rhodes, who had made a fortune in the Kimberley diamond fields in South Africa). Three years later the settlers found an excuse to attack and conquer the Ndebe state too.” The resulting tribal uprising was, as Palmer continues, “put down with appalling ferocity and indifference to human suffering. People hiding in defensive position in caves were blown out by dynamite. Those who surrendered had to do so unconditionally. Many ‘rebel leaders…were hanged. Some died in prison. Others received long prison sentences. The Chimurenga left very deep wounds, and influenced racial attitudes for decades afterward.”1

After the settlers took over, they renamed the area Rhodesia, after Cecil Rhodes. His company governed from 1890 to 1923. At that point, the settlers, who were now more African than British assumed control under the auspices of the Crown. The Crown Lands were offered at a fraction of the cost of land in Britain to entice more white Europeans to settle there and to provide more of a buttress to support the British society in Rhodesia.

White Rhodesia

Democracy and society in Britain has taken nearly 700 years to develop. One must engage in mental gymnastics to imagine a sudden British style society placed in the heart of Africa. To paraphrase Palmer, the Britons brought with them a parliamentary system of government, which was exclusively controlled by them. They also controlled all of the facets of the economy that they had built: rail, farming, education, roads, and anything else that one would find in a Western economy. With the economy of post-war Britain deeply in debt, the UK could no longer afford American tobacco imports. They then set up guarantees with their colony of Rhodesia to buy from them. The tripling of new settlers (to a level of 220,000, by 1960) required the forced movement of 100,000 Blacks into Native Reserves and off of the fertile land that would be used for even more farming.2

This further deepened the cleavage between Black and White, and produced a second cleavage between commercial and family farmers. More importantly, by 1960, the White control of some countries in Africa had been taken by revolutionary Black Africans, especially north of Rhodesia. This forced the White Africans in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Mozambique to arm themselves and protect their countries from the Black Africans who planned to take back their land. It must be remembered that the Whites were still very much a minority who wielded all of the political and economic power in their countries.

The revolutions in Africa were addressed by then Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in his ‘winds of change speech’ in 1960 at Cape Town. Mandella in Long Walk to Freedom relates, “In 1960, seventeen former colonies in Africa were scheduled to become independent states. In February, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited South Africa and gave a speech before Parliament in which he talked of “winds of change” sweeping Africa.3

The fact that a large number of former colonies were to be given their independence does not mean that they were to be given a truly democratic government. The White Africans would now be in control without the presence of a colonial power from Europe to answer to. While this concept of self rule seems easy enough, the path toward it varied from colony to colony. Michael Charlton explains: “By the turn of the century colonialism had become the tail that wagged the Whitehall dog. It had become policy to devolve power to the colonial territories. But into whose hands was not explicitly stated. At this point the ambiguities which arose became most acute concerning Rhodesia, which was almost wholly, but never quite, a self-governing dominion. Thereafter it seemed impossible to clear the British mind. Sir Michael Palliser (a career diplomat with the British Foreign Service and former African administrator, my parenthesis) again: This was never understood by the world outside, but Rhodesia was not a colony in the standard sense. We had in fact given a measure of independence to the Rhodesian whites, years before, which could not be clawed back…we did not actually have a colonial presence in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian whites ran themselves. So, here was a situation for which the world saw us as responsible, and for which we saw ourselves as responsible, but which was extremely difficult to handle because we did not have the instruments accompanying that responsibility.”4

The United Kingdom was devolving her Empire, and Rhodesia was next. Because the British had no real authority or control in Rhodesia and would have liked to see a ‘one man, one vote’ system set up, Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, Ian Smith’s hand was forced. To preserve his government’s all White power, he proclaimed independence. The now famous UDI, Unilateral Declaration of Independence, was declared in 1965. Africa was coming under control of Black Nationalists, Ian Smith was bent on preventing that in Rhodesia. As was stated earlier, Britain could not prevent this. To further consolidate his power, the UDI was, as Palmer states, “followed by the suppression of all internal political activity. Nationalist leaders such as Joshua Nkomo. Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, and many others were put in detention for over a decade.”5

Smith made the first critical error when dealing with revolutionaries: By putting them in jail they become martyrs, symbols for their followers to rally around. This also got the World’s attention. A trade embargo was quickly put in place. However, one must remember the geography and political situation in that area of Africa at that time. Rhodesia’s neighbors, White ruled South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique were also in the same situation as Rhodesia. They did not abide by the embargo. South Africa could not because she would be, if Rhodesia fell to the Nationalists who were very often Marxist, surrounded by hostile Marxist regimes. Therefore, it was in South Africa’s interest to help her White brothers in Rhodesia. This is the problem with sanctions, they are cumbersome and very difficult to enforce: They almost never work and often work in an opposite manner than they were intended. By placing an external threat on a nation, they can quickly unify behind their leaders against the external threat, thereby placing more power in the hands of the government that the embargo was supposed to weaken.

This sets up the stage for the major players in Rhodesia’s struggle: Ian Smith’s Rhodesia backed by South Africa, Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and Bishop Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC).

White Rhodesia, as has been stated was backed by South Africa. South Africa was, at that time, under the Apartheid system and the pariah of the World. Because the ZAPU/ZANU forces were backed by Moscow and her client’s (including Cuba), this placed the United States in a very interesting situation. In order to fight the spread of communism in Africa, and prevent the Marxist encirclement of South Africa, the United States needed help from South Africa to fight in southern Africa against the Marxist/Nationalist forces. The Cold War made some interesting bedfellows.

The history of the post-UDI violence is traced by Captain Bruton, 12^th Special Forces, US Army (his explanation is rather long and detailed, therefore I will paraphrase and simplify): ZAPU/ZANU were banned and the leaders jailed, their followers were exiled into the neighboring African countries where the ZAPU/ZANU cadre began to receive training from the Chinese in Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia. These countries provided a launching point for hit and run terrorist attacks. These groups were easily tracked down and killed by the security forces, ZAPU had been operationally destroyed by 1970. ZAPU took that opportunity to send some of their forces to Russia, Cuba, and North Korea for further training and indoctrination. In 1974, the coup in Portugal produced a government that negotiated with the Marxist FRELIMO and gave them complete control and independence over Mozambique. FRELIMO then placed training camps, supplies, and transportation at the disposal of ZANU. ZANU is backed by the Mashona tribe in the east while ZAPU is primarily Matabele from the west. They have fought each other as well as the Whites. Nkomo and Mugabe were not interested in sharing power after the struggle, therefore they resorted to gun-barrel politics. Captain Bruton, in his 1979 article, made a prediction that luckily did not come true, he stated that if international pressure caused the collapse of the current regime, these two forces would erupt in tribal violence that would rival the Nigerian Civil War. He continues by siting the methods of the PF’s war as a three step strategy: first, disruption of internal administration, second, complete intimidation of the populace through the use of murder, mayhem, and savage barbarism to break down traditional tribal authority and demonstrate government inability to provide security, 90% of the victims of the PF were Black, third, by continuing the war, the PF would render the counterinsurgency effort as cost-ineffective.6

The PF were engaged in a classic insurgency war. If the PF were to face the Rhodesian Army in normal land battle, they would be decimated. Therefore, by making life in Rhodesia as miserable and dangerous as possible, they were able to multiply their effectiveness tactically and economically. By reducing economic output, the tax base is reduced while the security costs incurred by the state spirals upward. It is a slow strangulation, but a strangulation none the less.

A revolution from below requires some basic structures to sustain itself, it must have a cleavage that is important to the peasant. Kriger sums this up nicely, “Revolutionary organizations seek popular support by manipulating peasant grievances. Hence the study of mobilization is inextricably linked to the question of why peasants participate in revolutions. Whether studies stress peasant responsiveness to normative or utilitarian appeals, almost all locate the primary peasant grievances outside peasant communities and focus especially on peasant grievances against the state or other classes (my emphasis).”7

It makes sense to define counterinsurgency along the lines of the major cleavage. In Rhodesia’s case, while there were underlying factors of inter-tribal violence, the main contention was between a White minority in power against a nearly powerless Black majority. Once the Black versus White cleavage is removed then the smaller conflicts come to the forefront.

Ian Smith, in 1978, finally caved a bit to the pressures of the counterinsurgency movement. One of the cleavages had been removed, somewhat.

In order to stop the war, Ian Smith agreed to negotiations with some ‘moderate’ Blacks. Galen Hull writing in Africa Today explains (I paraphrase): Prime Minister Ian Smith and three “internal” black nationalist leaders, after months of talks, had decided on a system of government that would slowly carry Rhodesia to majority rule. This “Internal Settlement” was reached without the participation of the PF leaders. It would guarantee over one-quarter of the parliament to the Whites for at least ten years, provide for protection against nationalist seizure of property, dual citizenship, and the slow incorporation of guerrilla forces that renounced terrorism into the Rhodesian Security Forces.8

With the 20/20 vision of historical hindsight, this agreement was destined to fail. An agreement to end a war that excludes one of the fighting sides is no agreement at all. Furthermore, this agreement skirted the main issue of majority government and White privilege. One thing that did change was the country’s name, Rhodesia was now called Zimbabwe, the pre-colonial name for the kingdom

This then placed the Whites along with the moderate Blacks, this group was then in conflict with the PF forces of ZANU and ZAPU.

In the international arena, the above arrangement then places the West in a very precarious position, Hull relates, “Britain and the U.S. have thus for resisted the temptation to recognize the internal settlement. This fact is probably due, not so much to disaffection with the less-than-perfect application of democratic principles in the proposed constitutional arrangement, as to the growing apprehension about Cuban and Soviet support for the Patriotic Front. It is imperative to the West’s interests that open civil war between adherents to the internal settlement and the guerrilla forces be avoided.”9

The Americans and British had, before Ian Smith entered into the Internal Plan, devised a plan that would stop the civil war. I paraphrase Hull: The Anglo-American plan would involve all sides in negotiations then free-elections, a joint British/UN force would act as peace keepers and monitor the elections. This plan was rejected by both side because of the British/UN presence and influence.10

South Africa and the West had strategic interests in keeping Zimbabwe out of the hands of a Leftist government. If Zimbabwe went Leftist, South Africa would then be surrounded and surely war would have broken out between the Marxist countries unified against South Africa. This would prevent the West from importing minerals, precious metals and diamonds, and ore that is very important to the defense industries. Mugomba relates, “Zimbabwe’s economy is the second most sophisticated after South Africa’s, and secondly, the country is geographically along a path from South Africa through Zambia to Kenya.”11

Margaret Thatcher, seeing that the Anglo-American Plan was rejected outright, met with other members in Lusaka. There she and Lord Carrington announced that all parties involved in the struggle in Zimbabwe would meet at Lancaster House. LeMelle states, “…the Lancaster House negotiations, which successively produced, over a four month period under the iron hand of Lord Carrington in the chair, a constitution, an agreement on transitional arrangements for a cease fire.”12

Because of space limitations, I can not detail the abuses that LeMelle describes in his article. To paraphrase, The Multi-National Commonwealth Peace Keeping Force were forced to rely on the military to report all cease-fire violations. Therefore, all reports were against the PF, and the government forces abuses were not reported. They were guilty of beatings and intimidation before the election. It must be stated here that an election had already occurred under the internal agreement therefore, the populous knew how and were to vote and they were already registered.13 (These elections had returned a Smith-Muzorewa government.)

The Road From Lancaster House

Zimbabwe’s government was now under control of Bishop Muzorewa, who was now a candidate in the new elections. LeMelle continues, “One does not have to be able to read and write, as many African Peasants in the tribal land trusts do not, to identify concrete basis issues and interests. In their perception and experience, Bishop Muzorewa was not only a failure but he had betrayed their hope and his own promise that there would be peace. To the contrary, killing and pillaging, largely at the hands of auxiliaries and Selous Scouts, had increased under the Bishop’s government. In addition, his election campaign insulted the intelligence of the Africans, appealed to fear and base instincts, and was nurtured by harassment and intimidation. The contradiction between the evil associated with the Bishop and the image of holiness associates with his clerical garb and accouterments clearly exposed the facade for what it was – a travesty. In a deeply religious country, one had to ask: How could a man of God enjoy the riches exhibited by the Bishop and be associated with the fundamental evil of continued white dominance and still represent Christian justice and charity? The Bishop’s campaign was counterproductive.”14

These abuses were known outside of Zimbabwe to her neighbors. One reason why the neighboring Marxists countries and their clients the PF for agreement to the Lancaster House agreement and allowing the abuses to continue until the election was that Mozambique and Zambia could no longer afford to support the PF.

As many of the articles and books that I have used in research for this paper state, Robert Mugabe (ZANU) and Nkomo (ZAPU) were always portrayed as Marxists. The press always placed that label beside their name in print. This put fear into the West. If either of them won or they gained a majority, the West and the Whites in Zimbabwe foresaw a Marxist anti-West, Pro-Soviet, anti-White government installed. Therefore, many obstacles were placed in front of the PF before the elections.

The great hope of the Whites was Bishop Muzorea, after all, he was their moderate Black that would not bite the hands that fed him. He was crushed in the election: Mugabe-57% of Black seats, Nkomo-20 seats, White reserved seats-28, all other candidates and parties were of no concern. Mugabe was then asked by the interim British Governor to form a government. LeMelle again. “The African People had spoken, spoken so decisively in the face of concerned British, White Rhodesian and South African efforts to make the road as difficult as possible for the Patriotic Front parties, that they, and the world, had no choice but to accept their decision.”15

Southall’s study on Zimbabwe’s refugees and resettlement covers pre-election and post-election factors, I paraphrase his article: A total count of refugees was estimated at 220,000 people. This number is probably inflated by the PF so that their case for more economic aid would be stronger. Official repatriation points were set up outside of Zimbabwe, many people simply did not go through the paperwork process and were then not tallied. The Rhodesians were guilty of slowing the pre-election repatriation process, this tactic did not work very well because of very porous borders and the avoidance of the refugees of the authorities. Mugabe has been given large sums of money, as Southall claims, to placate him and keep him friendly with the West.15

Gregory continues, “Armed with an indisputeable mandate to govern, Mugabe moved swiflty to form a coalition with the PF representing 87% of votes cast and 77 out of 80 black seats in the 100-seat House of Assembly; Nkomo himself accepted the post of Minister of Home Affairs. The White community was reassured by the conciliatory tone of Mugabe’s broadcast on the evening of his party’s victory and by the appointment of two prominent whites, the former RF Finance Minister, Mr. David Smith, and the President of the Commercial Farmer’s Union, Mr. Dennis Norman, to the key Cabinet posts of Commerce and Industry, and Agriculture.” He also states that integration of the Rhodesian military was essential for a peaceful transition, Mugabe assumed the military portfolio and placed a White decorated General, General Walls in charge of the military integration.

Military integration and state security were a thorn in Mugabe’s side. I will paraphrase Simon Baynham accounts of problems in these fields: General Wall had confirmed in a BBC interview that he had asked Margaret Thatcher to declare the elections null and void. He was removed.

In October 1980, fighting broke out again. This time it was factional violence. Minister Nkala, regarded as a traitor by the Ndebele tribe, made an inflammatory speech and the factional violence grew into a clash between ZAPU and ZANU. This stressed the relationship between Nkomo and Mugabe to the breaking point. It escalated into a dismissal of Nkomo from the Cabinet and then seasure of ZAPU property and imprisonment of Nkomo’s followers. The crackdown was led by 5 Brigade, a North Korean trained security force. They were under Mugabe’s control and were ordered against Nkomo’s Ndebele tribe. It was now Shona versus Ndebele. Mugabe charged South Africa with training ZAPU commandos. The crackdown was on.

After the 1985 elections, opponents of the government were hunted down, beaten, and their properties ransacked. Mugabe wanted a one-party state and was willing to commit atrocities to get it.18

This path was abandoned in1987 when ZAPU and ZANU again made peace. The parties were then merged and Mugabe became the first executive president. In 1990, on the 10^th anniversary of the Lancaster House Constitution, Mugabe gave up on the one-party state.

Mugabe’s government is not a socialist one in the truest sense. Private ownership of the major industries is still held. De Wall continues, “A substantial proportion of Zimbabwe’s industrial and commercial wealth is in private hands, and multinational companies hold much of the country’s equity: if that were to be limited, there would be less investment, less technology, less employment for the rapidly growing number of school-leavers. Multinationals control mining, tobacco marketing, hotels, and much manufacture. However, in the days of Rhodesia the country was already a mixed economy-the government was interventionist then, exercising considerable controls. That has changed little, and Zimbabwe has a sophisticated company law to exercise control, to determine in what particular areas business can and cannot operate.19

Conclusion

Zimbabwe is, in many ways, typical in the African Liberation Movement, in many ways she is not. She has experienced the inequities of European Colonialism. The Whites who modernized the country were not willing to give up power or control over what they had built on the backs of the Blacks. Continued struggle and revolutionary violence caused death, displacement, power plays by East and West in the continuing struggle between Communism and Capitalism. Eventually, the rising cost of internal security and the promise of an endless civil war forced the Whites to capitulate to the demands of the revolutionaries. Ian Smith only gave up as much power as would placate some of the Blacks. But, once the genie is left out of the bottle, it is impossible to put him back in. Because of international and internal pressure, Ian Smith was forced to the table in Lancaster House. The war was becoming too expensive for Mozambique and Zambia as well. They had no choice but to find a way out that would get the revolutionaries out of their country or face possible insurrection from them as well. All sides had to make concessions to stop the fighting.

Mugabe was lucky in the fact that he chose, after tribal/political violence nearly tore his new country apart, to work with the other side. He could have continued the crackdown. That would have made Zimbabwe typical. He would have become just another President-for-Life, a petty dictator without a legitimate government. He realized that Zimbabwe needed the West as well as his own citizenry to make Zimbabwe a responsible member of the World community with a successful economy.

Zimbabwe showed that in Africa, the Whites are not the only devils; Blacks are capable of killing and abusing each other as well. Given the repetition of violence in Africa, Zimbabwe is fortunate that it is still in one piece.

Text References

1. CIA World Fact Book. Washington: GPO, 1996

2. Palmer, Robin, and Isobel Birch. Zimbabwe, A Land Divided. Oxford: Oxfram

Publishing, 1992. Pages 6 and 7.

3. Ibid. paraphrased pages 8and 9

4. Mandella, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom. Little, Brown and Co. Publishing, 1995.

Page 237.

5. Charlton, Michael. The Last Colony in Africa. Worcester, England. Billing & Sons

Ltd., 1990. Page22.

6. Palmer. Zimbabwe, A Land Divided. Page 9.

7. Bruton, Captain James K. “Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia.” Military Review 59 (March 1979) : 26-39

8. Kriger, Norma J. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War . New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1992. Pages 238

9. Hull, Galen. “The Political Economy of Zimbabwe: Implication for the Internal

Settlement.” Africa Today (April-June 1978) :Pages 27-44

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Mugomba, Agrippah T. “Zimbabwe, Détente and the Strategy of Deceit.” Africa

Today (April-June 1978): Pages 45-55)

13. Le Melle, Tilden J. “Winning Against a Stacked Deck: The Election in Zimbabwe.”

Africa Today (1^st Quarter 1980): Pages 5-16

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Southall, Roger J. “Resettling the Refugees.” Africa Report (Nov.-Dec. 1980)

Pages 48-52

1. Zimbabwe in Transition. Edited by Simon Baynham. Stockholm. Almqvist &

Wiksell, 1992.

1. De Wall, Victor. The Politics of Reconciliation. Trenton, New Jersey. Afrrica

World Press, Inc., 1990. Page 127

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Hull, Richard W., “The Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia.” Current History. 78 (March

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Palmer, Robin and Isobel Birch. Zimbabwe A land Divided. Oxford, England: Oxfram,

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Consulted but not used

Henriques, Julian. “The Struggle of the Zimbabweans: Conflicts Between the

Nationalists and with the Rhodesian Regime.” African Affairs.

Payne, Richard. “The Soviet/Cuban Factor in the New United States Policy toward

Southern Frica.” Africa Today. (April-June 1978) 7-23.

“Rhodesia: Whites and Blacks on the Brink.” U.S. News and World Report. (June 5,

1978) 41-44.

Ranger, Bebbe. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Civil War. Portsmouth, New Hampshire:

Heinmann, 1995.

I also reviewed various articles from The Economist to familiarize myself with the situations in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.